The Changing Relative Power of Party Leaders in Congress*

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Abstract

For decades, political scientists have studied the relative power of parties and committees in the U.S. Congress, and the conditions under which power shifts to parties vs. committees. An influential theory within the discipline, Conditional Party Government (CPG), hypothesizes that as intra-party preferences become more homogeneous and inter-party preferences become more heterogeneous, rank-and-file members and committees transfer power to their party leaders. With few exceptions, previous tests of CPG and other theories of party power within Congress have relied on roll call votes to measure both the distribution of preferences within the chamber and the relative power or influence of party leaders. We propose an alternative approach to assess shifts of power within Congress by using PAC contributions and newspaper coverage. Since interest groups are sophisticated, strategic donors who target their campaign contributions to gain access and influence in Congress, following the money allows us to construct a measure of relative power between the rank-and-file, committee leaders, and party leaders. During the period 1978-2014, we find that party leaders receive an increasing share of the donations over time at the expense of committee leaders and the rank-and-file. The share of PAC donations to party leaders closely tracks standard measures of CPG. Another measure of power, based on newspaper coverage, produces similar patterns for an even longer period, from 1890-2014. Overall, our results provide strong support for the CPG theory.

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1 Introduction

One key hypothesis regarding the evolution of behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives is that changes in rules and norms transferred power from committee chairs and ranking members to party leaders and party caucuses. These changes began in the early to mid 1970s, and include: the Subcommittee Bill of Rights; weakening the agenda control of committee chairs; giving the Speaker the authority to choose the majority party's members of the Rules committee (i.e. 8 of 12 members); for Democrats, shifting the authority to make committee assignments from the Ways and Means committee to a steering committee and giving the Speaker the authority to choose a majority of that committee's members; giving party caucuses the authority to choose committee chairs, Appropriations subcommittee chairs, and ranking members (by secret ballot); making it easier for members to force recorded votes on the floor; reducing committee staff; and imposing term limits on committee chairs.[1]

One especially influential argument as to why these institutional changes occurred is the Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory.[2] According to the CPG theory, strong party government is conditional on the extent to which the preferences within parties align and the preferences between parties diverge. More specifically, the theory posits that as the preferences of the party caucuses become more homogeneous and the distance between the party caucuses grows, rank-and-file party members are more willing to transfer responsibilities and power to their party leaders. The CPG theory is perhaps the most prominent explanation of the ostensible rise in party responsibility and power in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. That numerous congressional and legislative scholars have extended, revised, and utilized the theory as an explanation for their findings is evidence of the theory's prominence in the field.[3]

A large literature has attacked the question of how much these reforms actually shifted the distribution of power from committees and rank-and-file members to party leaders. This literature has relied predominantly on roll call related outcomes such as party unity votes and roll rates. For example, Aldrich and Rohde (2000) find that the majority party is more likely to win on final passage party unity votes as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. Interestingly, while Cox and

[1] For example, see Shepsle (1989) and Rohde (1991).
[2] See, for example, Rohde (1991), Aldrich (1995), and Aldrich and Rohde (1997, 2000).
[3] For a few examples among many possibilities, see Carroll and Kim (2010), Hall and Shepsle (2014); Ladewig (2005); Patty (2008); Roberts and Smith (2003); and Volden and Bergman (2006).

McCubbins (2005) find no relationship between CPG and negative agenda control, as measured by the majority-party roll rate, they do find a relationship between CPG and positive agenda control, as measured by the minority-party roll rate. Another common approach is to examine trends in the use of special rules that might steer policy away from the floor median and towards the majority party median. For instance, Rohde (1991) and Aldrich, Perry, and Rohde (2013) find that votes on special rules grow more partisan with the condition. Numerous other studies explore this question and related questions using a variety of outcome measures constructed from roll call votes and legislator behavior within the chamber.[4]

While the findings from this literature largely provide support for the CPG theory, the reliance on roll call based measures subjects extant research to a compelling critique from Krehbiel (2000). Krehbiel argues that it is extremely difficult to disentangle legislators' true preferences from partisan pressures when analyzing their roll call votes.[5] Yet, roll call votes are used to measure both the degree to which the condition in CPG is satisfied—the explanatory variable of interest—and the degree to which members transfer power to their party leaders—the outcome of interest. When both sides of the equation utilize roll call measures, any observed relationship might simply be a tautology.[6] Instead, Krehbiel argues that members from a given party vote together more often simply because their within party preferences are more aligned rather than the result of the institutional reforms described above. In Krehbiel's view, as the condition is increasingly satisfied, members engage in roll call behavior that is ostensibly indicative of increased party power but is in fact the result of homogeneous policy preferences within the party.

[4]For example, Forgette and Sala (1999) use senators' turnout on "party-salient" roll call votes as an outcome; Roberts (2005) examines roll call votes on motions to recommit in response to a formal model by Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002); Kriner and Schwartz (2008) analyze high-publicity congressional investigations; and Moscardelli, Haspel, and Wike (1998) examine a specific roll call vote on a campaign finance reform measure. Taylor (2003) is an important exception to the literature's focus on outcomes based on legislators' roll call voting behavior. He instead examines campaign contributions from PACs associated with tobacco and alcoholic beverage industries. He finds that PACs associated with both industries donate relatively more to the majority party leadership as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. In addition, in their studies of state legislatures, Fouirnaies and Hall (2015) and Fouirnaies (2016) adopt a similar approach, using campaign contributions to assess how powerful or valuable different sets of legislators are. While Fouirnaies and Hall (2015) find that assuming a role as a majority party leader in a state legislature yields a sizable increase in campaign contributions for a legislator, they " find no link between the polarization of the legislature and the power that flows to the majority-party leader." Interestingly, in this study we find the opposite for the U.S. House of Representatives; party polarization within the chamber is strongly related to the relative power of party leaders.

[5]As Clinton (2012) notes, "Analyzing roll calls can only recover the preferences that rationalize the observed votes given the assumed model of individual choice as implemented via a statistical model."

[6]In his critique, Krehbiel (2000) states, "Vote-based measures of partisanship are often correlated with one another (Cox and McCubbins, 1991, 1993), and it is not uncommon to interpret such collinearity as evidence of validity. A more skeptical stance is adopted in this paper."

In this paper we propose an alternative approach to assess the effects of these reforms, using two measures that do not rely on roll call votes. The first measure uses PAC contributions, and the second utilizes newspaper coverage.

For the first measure, we propose using campaign donations, in particular political action committee (PAC) donations from interest groups, to measure power. The idea follows from Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) and is straightforward. Interest groups use campaign contributions to gain access to, and possibly influence, members of Congress. These groups are strategic actors with a stake in policy outcomes. The value of access to a given representative is increasing in the power that the representative commands. Therefore, more PAC resources flow to relatively more powerful members.[7]

The second measure is based on newspaper coverage. The idea is similar in spirit: given the limited space available for covering politics in general and Congress in particular, newspaper editors and journalists tend to devote more space to powerful political actors rather than weak actors. Ban et al. (2015) present the logic in more detail and present a number of examples that demonstrate the validity of the general idea. We adapt the idea and use newspaper coverage to analyze the relative power of party leaders to committee leaders in Congress. Furthermore, the newspaper measure spans a much longer time period, i.e. 1890-2014, compared to the PAC contributions measure.[8]

Our two measures are complementary, as both newspapers and PACs are careful external observers of Congress with finite resources (i.e., space on their pages and money to contribute). However, PACs and newspapers have very different sets of incentives driving their behavior. PACs seek access to powerful elected officials in search of favorable policy outcomes, while newspapers publish content on matters of importance and interest to their readership.[9] The advantage of utilizing both measures is that they are driven by different actors with distinct sets of incentives, and thus the measures are unlikely to be susceptible to the same sources of bias.[10]

The findings are clear. During the period 1978-2014—the period for which we have detailed data on campaign contributions—party leaders experience a dramatic growth in their average share

[7] See Snyder (1992, 1993), Romer and Snyder (1994), and Cox and Magar (1999) for other applications of this general idea.

[8] Federal Election Commission data on campaign contributions from PACs are only available starting in 1978.

[9] Newspapers want to provide coverage that their readers find interesting so as to maximize their circulation and advertising revenues.

[10] For a given potential source of bias to be problematic, it needs to affect the behavior of both newspaper editors and PACs.

of all PAC contributions as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. The expected increase in the share of PAC contributions to a majority party leader is over 8 times greater than the expected increase for a committee chair given the observed growth in CPG during this time period.[11,12] In fact, for a majority party leader, this growth corresponds to a 56% increase in their expected share of PAC contributions. On the minority side, the expected increase in the share of PAC contributions to a party leader is about 5 times greater than the expected increase for a ranking member given the observed increase in CPG.[13] The increase in the share of PAC contributions to party leaders relative to committee leaders is remarkably stable and robust to the inclusion of various controls (including seniority and measures of electoral risk), member fixed effects, restricting the sample to only party and committee leaders, restricting the sample to only senior members, and including PAC contributions to members' leadership committees. It is important to note that the outcome under study is the share of PAC contributions (in percentage terms) distributed to members in a given Congress. Thus, the growth in PAC contributions to party leaders that we document in this study is entirely due to PACs directing more resources to party leaders and away from other members rather than simply a secular increase in PAC spending.

The patterns are similar when we examine newspaper coverage. During the period 1947-2014, newspapers devoted an increasing share of their coverage to party leaders relative to committee leaders. While the expected share of party leader coverage is 52% given the observed CPG in the 80th Congress (1947-1948), it increased to 76% by the 113th Congress (2013-2014). Indeed the correlation between our measure of relative newspaper coverage and the CPG measure is 0.84. Again, it is worth emphasizing that, like the PAC contributions measure, this outcome is measured in relative terms. Thus, newspapers are devoting substantially *more* of their coverage to party leaders and substantially *less* to committee leaders.

While neither outcome measure is without flaws, both newspapers and PACs are sophisticated observers of Congress with constrained resources. That both sets of actors markedly shift their resources toward party leaders is highly suggestive of an actual shift in power from committees to

[11] When we write *expected* increase (or decrease), we are referring to the conditional expectation function.

[12] Throughout the paper we refer to majority party leaders and minority party leaders. When we do so, we are referring to members serving in the three majority party leader positions in the House (Speaker, Majority Party Leader, and Majority Whip) and the two minority party leader positions (Minority Leader and Minority Whip).

[13] All of the calculations in this paragraph are derived from specification (1) in Table 3 and Table A.5.

party leaders, as predicted by the CPG theory. The relationship between the CPG measure and both outcomes is highly robust and substantively large.

2 Results for PAC Contributions

We study campaign contributions to representatives serving in the 95th to 113th Congresses (elections held during the period 1978-2014), using data from the Federal Elections Commission.[14] For each U.S. House incumbent i serving in Congress t and running for reelection, let $PAC\ Contributions_{it}$ be the total amount of campaign contributions i receives from all PACs during the two-year election cycle coinciding with Congress t.[15] We measure the relative value of representative i as his or her share of total PAC contributions to all representatives running for reelection (the set I_t):

$$Percentage\ of\ PAC\ Contributions_{it} = \frac{PAC\ Contributions_{it}}{\sum_{j \in I_t} PAC\ Contributions_{jt}} \times 100\%$$

We consider two versions of this variable, one that includes only the main reelection campaign committee of each representative, and one that also includes the PAC contributions made to representatives' "leadership" committees (leadership PACs).[16]

We define the set of party leaders as the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader, the Majority Whip, the Minority Leader, and the Minority Whip. Committee leaders are chairs and ranking members. We use data from Charles Stewart, Garrison Nelson, and Jonathan Woon to determine which incumbents are party leaders, committee chairs, and ranking members.[17] We use this data to construct four indicator variables: $Majority\ Party\ Leader_{it}$, $Minority\ Party\ Leader_{it}$,

[14] See http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftp_download.shtml for details.

[15] We must restrict our sample to incumbents seeking reelection, as we need to observe their status as party and committee leaders and the contributions they receive from PACs.

[16] According to the FEC, "A leadership PAC is a non-connected committee that supports/opposes more than one federal candidate and that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a federal candidate or office holder which is neither an authorized committee nor affiliated with the candidate's authorized committee." Also according to the FEC, a leadership PAC "is not an authorized committee of the candidate or officeholder and is not affiliated with an authorized committee of a candidate or officeholder (so is not campaigning on behalf of that person's election)." Members of Congress use their leadership committees to raise funds to donate to other candidates, and also to pay other expenses. Some groups argue that leadership committees are often used to evade campaign finance regulations and they should be banned.

[17] See http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html for more details. Nelson and Stewart (2010) and Groseclose and Stewart (1998) are two examples of research that use this data.

Comittee Chair$_{it}$ and *Comittee Ranking Member*$_{it}$. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the number of observations in our sample in each of these categories for the 95th to 113th Congress.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for *Percentage of PAC Contributions*$_{it}$. The top panel includes only donations to representatives' main campaign committees, while the bottom panel also includes donations to members' leadership committees. Consider the top panel. Across the 95th to 113th Congresses, a majority party leader on average received 0.73% of all PAC contributions to representatives running for reelection. This is much larger than the 0.31% received by the average committee chair, or the 0.24% received by the average rank and file member. While these individual mean percentages may at first glance seem small, this is because the "pie" is quite large. For example, the representatives running for reelection in the 113th Congress collectively received $291 million in PAC contributions, and 0.50% of this would have been almost $146,000.

Table 1 – Percentage of PAC Contributions, 95th–113th Congresses

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N
Without Leadership Committees				
Majority party leaders	0.72%	0.72%	0.26%	54
Minority party leaders	0.65%	0.64%	0.27%	36
Committee chairs	0.31%	0.27%	0.21%	360
Ranking members	0.26%	0.23%	0.16%	354
Rank-and-file	0.24%	0.21%	0.15%	6726
With Leadership Committees				
Majority party leaders	1.03%	1.01%	0.38%	51
Minority party leaders	0.83%	0.73%	0.38%	34
Committee chairs	0.33%	0.28%	0.23%	342
Ranking members	0.27%	0.23%	0.17%	335
Rank-and-file	0.24%	0.21%	0.15%	6384

We use a measure of conditional party government developed in Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) and constructed using data from Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2007). They construct their measure as follows. First, they define M_t^1 as the difference between the party median DW-NOMINATE scores in Congress t; M_t^2 as the ratio of the standard deviation of DW-NOMINATE scores for the majority party to the standard deviation for the full chamber (subtracted from 1); M_t^3 as the R-squared from regressing DW-NOMINATE scores on party affiliation; and M_t^4 as the proportion of overlap of DW-NOMINATE scores between the two

parties (subtracted from 1). Next, Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) run a linear factor analysis on (M^1, M^2, M^3, M^4), and extract the first principal factor. We use their measure and call it *CPG Score*$_t$.[18]

In some regressions we include additional control variables. Since previous work finds that incumbents who are electorally vulnerable raise and spend significantly more in their campaigns, the main set of controls attempts to capture electoral competition. The variables are *Quality Challenger*$_{it}$, *Uncontested Election*$_{it}$, *Safeness of District*$_{it}$, *Midterm*$_t$, *Same Party as President*$_{it}$, and *Midterm*$_t\times$ *Same Party as President*$_{it}$.[19] In some specifications we add two other variables. The first is *Seniority*$_{it}$, measured as the number of terms served. The second is a measure of progressive ambition, *Seeking Senate Seat*$_{it}$, defined as 1 for representatives who ran for the U.S. Senate in the subsequent election cycle.

We begin with two figures that illustrate the basic patterns. Figure 1 has two panels.[20] The left panel shows the changes in *Percentage of PAC Contributions* over time for House party leaders, committee leaders (chairs or ranking members), and other MCs. As seen from the figure, *Percentage of PAC Contributions* grows sharply for party leaders. This growth is substantively large. For example, for party leaders *Percentage of PAC Contributions* increases from an average of 0.52% in the first four Congresses to 0.83% in the last four—an increase of 60%. For committee leaders the growth is positive but much smaller, while for rank-and-file members there is no growth or even a decline.[21]

[18] Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) study the four components separately and their relationship. Although the literature investigating the CPG theory is extensive (see the survey above), there is not a single, conventional measure of GPG. The Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) measure that we employ, and its components, are utilized quite widely. Also, as Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) note, the individual components are highly correlated with one another and the first principal factor (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for the correlation matrix). For example, Aldrich and Battista (2002) utilize the four components separately, and Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008) and Aldrich (2011) use the two-dimensional analog of this measure developed in Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias (2007). Other scholars use a variant of one of these four measures; for instance, Hetherington (2001) utilizes a Euclidean distance measure and correlates it with the measures from Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) to provide evidence for the validity of his measure. Finally, some researchers simply assert that certain time periods are strong-party or weak-party eras.

[19] *Quality Challenger*$_{it}$ is coded = 1 if the candidate has previously held elective office. *Safeness of District*$_{it}$ is based on the mean-deviated presidential vote share in the concurrent election (in presidential years) and the most recent election (in midterm years). We re-scale this variable between 0 and 1 to measure the safeness of the district from the perspective of the incumbent.

[20] The Appendix Figure A.1 further separates Figure 1 into panels for majority and minority party.

[21] For committee leaders (committee chairs and ranking members), *Percentage of PAC Contributions* increases from an average of 0.27% in the first four Congresses to 0.30%—an increase of 11%. For rank-and-file members, *Percentage of PAC Contributions* decreases from an average of 0.25% in the first four Congresses to 0.24% in the last four Congresses.

Figure 1 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File.



The right panel is analogous, but the x-axis is now *CPG Score* rather than election cycle. Evidently, there is strong, positive association between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* to party leaders and *CPG Score*. For party leaders the correlation is 0.36. There is much less of an association for committee leaders or other representatives.[22]

Figure 2 has the same structure as Figure 1, but PAC contributions include donations to members' leadership committees in addition to their main campaign committees.[23] Overall, the patterns are even starker than in Figure 1. For example, for party leaders *Percentage of PAC Contributions* increases from an average of 0.59% in the first four Congresses to 1.20% in the last four—an increase of 103%. For committee leaders the growth is positive but much smaller, while for rank-and-file members there is no growth or even a decline.[24]

[22] For committee leaders (committee chairs and ranking members) the correlation is 0.07, and for rank-and-file members the correlation is -0.03.)

[23] Appendix Table A.2 further separates Figure 2 into panels for majority and minority party.

[24] For committee leaders (committee chairs and ranking members), *Percentage of PAC Contributions* increases from an average of 0.27% in the first four Congresses to 0.33%—an increase of 22%. For rank-and-file members, *Percentage of PAC Contributions* decreases from an average of 0.24% in the first four Congresses to 0.23% in the last four Congresses.

Figure 2 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions (Including Leadership Committee Contributions) to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File.



Note that although there has been a steep growth in the number and size of leadership committees, the strong relationships shown in Figure 2 are not "mechanical," because party leaders are not the only House members with leadership committees. Many committee chairs and ranking members have them as well, as do a substantial number of rank-and-file members. Over the period 1980-2014, 526 different representatives had active leadership committees at some point, only 21 of whom were party leaders. What Figure 2 shows is that over time, as CPG has risen, PACs have been increasingly donating to the leadership committees run by party leaders, compared to the leadership committees run by committee leaders (and rank-and-file members).

Table 2 presents the results in regression form. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is constructed using only representatives' main campaign committees, while in columns 4-6 the dependent variable also includes representatives' leadership committees. We only show the coefficients of interest (the full set of estimates are in Appendix Table A.4), and we vary the vector of additional control variables across the columns. In every column, the estimated coefficient on the key party leader variable *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is large, positive, and statistically significant. From this, we can infer that *Percentage of PAC Contributions* to party leaders are significantly higher

Table 2 – Results Based on Full Sample

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.283*	0.314*	0.308*	0.605*	0.651*	0.648*
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.011*	0.013*	-0.016*	0.009	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.226	0.229	0.210	0.299	0.302
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file members.

when *CPG Score* is high rather than low. By contrast, the estimated coefficients on the committee leader variable are much smaller. Indeed, F-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Leader* all strongly reject the null hypothesis. Thus, from the evidence in Table 2, we can infer that the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score* is stronger for party leaders than for committee leaders.

Table 3 presents the results by party. As in Table 2, we show only the coefficients of interest (the full set of estimates are in Appendix Table A.5) and vary the vector of additional control variables across the columns. The patterns when separating by majority and minority party are similar to those in Table 2. The estimated coefficients on the key party leader variables, *CPG Score* × *Majority Party Leader* and *CPG Score* × *Minority Party Leader*, are both large, positive, and statistically significant in all specifications. They imply that for both majority and minority parties, the *Percentage of PAC Contributions* to party leaders are significantly higher when *CPG Score* is high rather than low. By contrast, the estimated coefficients on the two committee leader variables are much smaller. They are all statistically insignificant for the majority party, and insignificant for both parties in the third column when we include the full set of controls. Also, F-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Majority Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Chair* (denoted $F_{Majority}$) always strongly reject the null hypothesis. The same is true for the hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Minority Party Leader* is equal

Table 3 – Results Based on Full Sample

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.288*	0.358*	0.350*	0.583*	0.688*	0.684*
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	0.268*	0.255*	0.249*	0.633*	0.622*	0.618*
	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.083)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.034	0.035	0.032	0.085*	0.082*	0.082*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.071*	0.067*	0.069*	0.101*	0.091*	0.091*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.021	0.010	0.005	0.033*	0.015	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
CPG Score	-0.020*	0.008	0.012	-0.032*	0.002	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.111	0.232	0.236	0.223	0.311	0.315
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.012	0.010	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file members.

to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Ranking Member* (denoted $F_{Minority}$). Evidently, the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score* is stronger for party leaders than for committee leaders in both majority and minority parties.

Many of the reforms in the 1970s were viewed as transferring power from committee chairs and ranking members to party leaders.[25] To examine the transfer of power between party leaders and committee leaders only, we can exclude the rank-and-file category and recompute *Percentage of PAC Contributions* using the population of party leaders and committee leaders only. Figure 3 illustrates the same pattern of party leaders gaining substantially more in their average percentage of PAC contributions across time and as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. When we restrict attention only to party leaders and committee leaders, it is clear that party leaders are gaining more power at the expense of committee leaders.

[25] As mentioned in the introduction, these reforms included the weakening of agenda control of committee chairs, the Speaker gaining the authority to choose the majority party's members of the Rules committee, the reduction of committee staff, the imposition of term limits on committee chairs, and the shifting of committee assignment power from the Ways and Means committee to a steering committee with a majority of Speaker-appointed members (for Democrats), among other reforms.

Figure 3 – Relative Percentage of PAC Contributions, Sample Restricted to Party Leaders and Committee Leaders.



Table 4 presents the regression estimates when we restrict attention only to party leaders vs. committee chairs, dropping rank-and-file members from the analysis. The denominator of the dependent variable in this table only includes party and committee leaders (not all representatives). The patterns are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 2 and Table 3, especially for the majority party. The estimated coefficient on *CPG Score*×*Majority Party Leader* is always large, positive, and statistically significant, while the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Chair* is always negative (and insignificant). Also, the F-test always rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score*×*Majority Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score*×*Committee Chair*. The results are weaker and statistically insignificant for the minority party, but they point in the predicted direction.

Table 4 – Results Based on Sample Restricted to Party and Committee Leaders

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	1.195*	1.712*	1.847*	1.824*	2.488*	2.616*
	(0.605)	(0.600)	(0.608)	(0.692)	(0.690)	(0.699)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	1.066	0.992	1.051	2.412*	2.403*	2.450*
	(0.725)	(0.696)	(0.698)	(0.830)	(0.799)	(0.801)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	-0.221	-0.220	-0.123	-0.092	-0.143	-0.052
	(0.316)	(0.314)	(0.322)	(0.359)	(0.361)	(0.369)
CPG Score	0.117	0.252	0.190	-0.014	0.131	0.076
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.260)
Observations	804	775	775	762	734	734
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.361	0.361	0.466	0.509	0.509
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.020	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.142	0.155	0.133	0.004	0.003	0.002
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is ranking members.

In addition, we construct an alternative measure of the *Percentage of PAC Contributions* outcome by counting only those contributions made in the non-election year.[26] The advantage of using this alternative measure is that contributions made in non-election years are less likely to be driven by fundraising and electoral pressures. Instead, in non-election years in particular, PACs are likely making contributions to attempt to gain access to and influence over the most powerful members.[27] While the fundraising responsibilities of party leaders may have increased over time, this measure is less susceptible to such concerns. Results based on this alternative outcome measure are displayed in the Appendix in Figures A.3-A.4 and Tables A.10-A.11. Using this non-election year measure, the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is again larger than the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Leader*, and an F-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal. The estimates from these specifications continue to provide support for the CPG hypothesis and are of a similar magnitude to our earlier estimates. If anything, these results provide even stronger support for the hypothesis.

While not the focus of the paper, we also estimate models in which we include member-specific fixed-effects. This specification might help to rule out a hypothesis such as the following: As

[26] For instance, we only count PAC contributions made in 2013 for the 113th Congress, which was in session during calendar years 2013-2014.

[27] Fouirnaies (2016) uses a similar measure for the same purpose.

campaign money has become increasingly important over time, each party has increasingly chosen party leaders who are good fundraisers. If fundraising ability is a fixed attribute—Nancy Pelosi was a good fundraiser even before she became Minority Leader or Speaker—then the member-specific fixed-effects will capture this attribute. The results are in the Appendix in Table A.6. Overall, the pattern of estimates is similar to that in Table 3. Again, the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score* appears to be stronger for party leaders than for committee leaders. Also, the relationships appear even clearer when we include donations to members' leadership committees.

3 Results for Newspaper Coverage

Ban et al. (2015) argue that the relative amount of newspaper coverage devoted to political actors A and B should reflect the relative power of A vs. B, at least after controlling for the intrinsic entertainment value of the actors. They validate this idea by checking how accurately the newspaper coverage measure correlates with an existing measure of power in five cases where some existing measure of power was available. For instance, they estimate the change in the relative coverage of mayors in cities that switch from a strong mayor (mayor-council) form to a weak mayor (council-manager) form of government.[28] In all cases, newspaper coverage proves to be a meaningful indicator of political power that is broadly applicable to a variety of political offices and contexts. In this section, we adapt this idea and use newspaper coverage to test the relative power of party leaders in Congress.

[28]The complete set of cases is as follows: (i) comparing the relative coverage of congressional committees to the desirability of committees based on member transfer requests; (ii) examining coverage of members of Congress before, during, and after they are Speaker of the House; (iii) estimating the change in the relative coverage of mayors in cities that changed from a mayor-council to a council-manager form of government; (iv) investigating the effect of the passage of a reform that stripped the Massachusetts Governor's Council of most of its powers on the relative coverage of the Council; and (v) looking at the relative coverage of the President in the context of tariff policymaking authority before and after the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. For example, in the third validation test using mayors, the authors study the newspaper coverage of three local offices: mayor, city council, and city manager. Historically, many cities have switched from a mayor-council form of government (where there is a mayor endowed with strong executive authority) to a council-manager form of government (where the council appoints a city manager to oversee the operation of the executive branch and the mayor has little to no executive authority). Through a series of checks, the authors find that the relative amounts of newspaper coverage for the three local offices of interest do indeed capture the clear change in relative power associated with the changes in city government structure.

We count articles in eight newspapers in the Proquest archive for each year during the period 1890-2014.[29] We construct two variables, *Party Leader Hits*$_t$ and *Committee Leader Hits*$_t$. For party leaders, we search for the string: "Congress" AND ("House Speaker" OR "Speaker of the House" OR "House Majority Leader" OR "House Minority Leader"). For committee leaders, we search for the string: "Congress" AND ("Chairman of the House" OR "Chairwoman of the House" OR "Chair of the House" OR "Ranking Member of the House") AND "Committee". We group odd and even-numbered years together by Congress (1947 with 1948, 1949 with 1950 etc.), and then make the variable:

$$\textit{Party Leader Percentage of Hits}_t = \frac{\textit{Party Leader Hits}_t}{\textit{Party Leader Hits}_t + \textit{Committee Leader Hits}_t} \times 100\%$$

Note, to smooth out random noise, in the analyses below we use a three-Congress moving average of *Party Leader Percentage of Hits*.[30]

One possible concern regarding the use of PAC contributions data is that fundraising skills may have become an increasingly important prerequisite for party leaders. In other words, if the importance of fundraising has increased over time, members may choose to select top fundraisers as their party leaders. If this were true, the increasing share of contributions to party leaders might merely reflect fundraising skills rather than power. This concern, however, does not apply to the newspaper coverage measure, as it is highly unlikely that newspapers report more on party leaders because of their fundraising skills. While the newspaper measure has its own potential problems—e.g. inflated coverage due to entertainment value or scandals—it does not share the same concerns as the PAC contributions measure.

Figure 4 plots *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* across time and CPG, for the same time period as the PAC contributions measure (1978-2014). As in Figure 3, we see that the newspaper coverage of party leaders has been increasing across time and as CPG increases, at the expense of committee leaders. The newspaper coverage measure highly suggests a shift in power from committee chairs to party leaders. The correlation between the newspaper measure and the CPG score for this time

[29] The newspapers are *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Boston Globe*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *Newsday* (Long Island), *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*.

[30] The results are substantively quite similar when we do not use raw measure rather than the moving average.

period is 0.82. That the newspaper coverage shows the same shift in power to party leaders as the PAC contributions measure provides further evidence for the CPG hypothesis.

Figure 4 – Relative Newspaper Coverage of Party Leaders and Committee Chairs



Using newspaper coverage data allows us to extend the time period of study to nearly a full century before the start of our PAC contributions data. Figure 5 presents the data across time. Starting in 1890, we see that *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* decreases until around 1920. Within this 1890-1920 time period, a sharp decline is apparent around 1910, which coincides with the revolt against Speaker Joseph Gurney Cannon. Almost universally, scholars view the Reed-Cannon period from about 1890-1910 as the apex of "strong party rule" in the U.S. House. Brady and Phillip (1974), Cooper and Brady (1981), and Sinclair (1990) all characterize the period 1890-1910 as one with a centralized, speaker-led House.[31]

After the revolt against Cannon, the House became more institutionally decentralized (Collie and Brady, 1985). As Schickler (2001) notes, "By the 1920s, it was commonplace to argue that 'leadership in the House is in commission'... Party leaders, committee chairmen, the Rules Committee, and rank-and-file members competed for influence, so that no single officer or group was as powerful as the Speaker had been in the Reed-Cannon era." In particular, Schickler (2001) points

[31]Schickler (2001) partially dissents from the view that the entire 1890-1910 period was a strong-party era. He instead argues that during the years of Democratic control, 1891-1895, the leadership was "paralyzed" and that the Henderson speakership of 1899-1903 was weak. However, Schickler (2001) does characterize both the Reed and Cannon speakerships as strong and centralized.

Figure 5 – Percentage Party Leader Hits Time Trend, 1890-2014



to the Rules Committee as a key actor after the 1910 revolt: "The Norris resolution loosened the Speaker's influence over Rules without directly challenging the committee's powers." Consistent with these accounts of organizational decentralization in the chamber, Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979) show that there was a long-term decline in party voting on roll calls in the U.S. House after the revolt against Cannon through the 1960s. They describe 1890-1910 as a a high period of party voting, 1911-1940 as an intermediate period, and 1941-1968 as a low period. According to Rohde (1991), the reforms leading to the current strong-party eras began in 1970.[32] Similarly, Hall and Shepsle (2014) delineate 1977 as the start of a strong-party era after the 1970s committee reforms. An increase in *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* is especially apparent across the 1970s, in line with the committee reforms of that decade.

Figure 6 plots the newspaper coverage measure against the CPG score. The grey triangles represent observations during the time period just after the Cannon revolt through 1930. During this time period, the condition for CPG was strong (as measured by the CPG score), but the

[32]Rohde (1991) focuses on the reforms adopted during the period 1970-1977 (see, e.g, pages 16-17). On page 85 he highlights the expansion of the whip system, beginning in 1970 with the creation of the chief deputy whip post.

Figure 6 – Percentage Party Leader Hits vs. CPG Score, 1890-2014



relative newspaper coverage of party leaders was low. Overall, despite this anomalous period, there is a clear, positive relationship between the CPG score and relative newspaper coverage throughout the 1890-2014 time period. The bottom line is that the newspaper coverage measure exhibits the same overall patterns as the PAC donations.

4 Conclusion

This is a straightforward paper with a simple bottom line. We study PAC donations during the period 1978-2014, and find that party leaders received an increasing share of the donations over time, at the expense of committee leaders and the rank-and-file. As a result, the share of PAC donations to leaders is highly correlated with standard measures of CPG. We also study a measure of power based on the share of newspaper coverage devoted to party leaders vs. committee leaders, and find similar patterns for the 1978-2014 period, as well as for an even longer period, from 1890-2014. Since both measures are consistent with each other, we have more confidence that as CPG increases, the power of party leaders increases.

We end by noting some of the possible limitations of our analysis, and pointing out some possible directions for future research. First, it might be that PACs do not have independent information about the actual distribution of power in Congress, but they give more money to party leaders because they have read the research of political scientists (or other observers) and *believe* that party leaders have become more powerful. The same could be true of newspaper editors and reporters. While potentially flattering to the profession, this seems doubtful.

As noted above, another possibility is that the parties have increasingly turned to representatives with strong fundraising skills in choosing their leaders. The specifications that include member-specific fixed effects help address this alternative, but only partially. An alternative explanation that is more difficult to rule out is that rank-and-file members have come to expect party leaders to play a larger fundraising role, so that representatives change their behavior, and devote much more time and effort to fundraising, after moving into party leadership positions. It is not clear to us how these alternatives can account for the observed patterns in newspaper coverage, but that might simply reflect our lack of creativity.

Both of our measures could probably be improved, at least to some degree. For instance, we might try to drop "ideological" PACs, whose contribution behavior is geared more toward changing the composition of congress than pragmatic concerns such as access to the most powerful legislators.[33] In a similar vein, the results from the newspaper coverage might be improved by further refining the construction of the measure. For example, the newspaper content could be cleaned to filter out scandals and sensational coverage, which may artificially inflate the measure and lead us to overestimate "power."[34] On the other hand, scandals are likely to happen in both weak party eras and strong party eras, so it is unlikely that further filtering of scandals and sensational coverage would substantively change the main patterns that we report.

Finally, another measure of CPG would strengthen not only our paper but the literature as a whole. Recall that the CPG hypothesis involves the distribution of *preferences* of representatives within and across parties. We adopt the measure of CPG developed by Aldrich and Rohde, but as many scholars have noted this may capture *outcomes* as much the underlying preferences of member of Congress, since it is based on roll call voting decisions. Better measures might be

[33] See, e.g., Romer and Snyder (1994).

[34] As long as scandals are not correlated with CPG, sensational coverage should add noise rather than confound the analysis.

developed using behavior that is potentially less subject to pressure from parties and interest groups, such as members' speeches or bill sponsorship, or perhaps using underlying characteristics of members' districts.

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A. 1 Appendix

Table A.1 – Sample Size by Congress

Congress	Election Cycle	Majority Party Leaders	Minority Party Leaders	Committee Chairs	Ranking Members	Total (Includes Rank-and-File)
95	1978	3	2	18	19	384
96	1980	3	2	19	20	400
97	1982	3	2	21	19	393
98	1984	3	2	22	18	411
99	1986	2	2	20	20	392
100	1988	3	1	21	19	410
101	1990	3	2	21	22	407
102	1992	3	2	19	13	371
103	1994	3	1	22	21	388
104	1996	1	2	15	16	374
105	1998	3	2	18	19	400
106	2000	3	2	15	16	403
107	2002	2	2	17	18	399
108	2004	3	2	18	21	406
109	2006	3	2	16	21	408
110	2008	3	2	21	17	402
111	2010	3	2	21	18	398
112	2012	3	2	19	19	393
113	2014	4	2	17	18	391

Table A.2 – Percentage with Leadership PAC

Congress	Election Cycle	Majority Party Leaders	Minority Party Leaders	Committee Chairs	Ranking Members	All (Includes Rank-and-File)
96	1980	66.7%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%
97	1982	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.6%
98	1984	66.7%	50.0%	9.1%	0.0%	3.6%
99	1986	100.0%	50.0%	5.0%	0.0%	3.3%
100	1988	100.0%	100.0%	9.5%	0.0%	3.2%
101	1990	100.0%	50.0%	4.8%	0.0%	2.0%
102	1992	66.7%	100.0%	5.3%	0.0%	3.0%
103	1994	66.7%	100.0%	9.1%	0.0%	4.4%
104	1996	100.0%	50.0%	20.0%	12.5%	7.0%
105	1998	100.0%	100.0%	33.3%	15.8%	12.5%
106	2000	100.0%	100.0%	40.0%	31.2%	21.3%
107	2002	100.0%	100.0%	58.8%	38.9%	28.6%
108	2004	100.0%	100.0%	61.1%	42.9%	37.4%
109	2006	100.0%	100.0%	81.2%	57.1%	47.1%
110	2008	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	82.4%	51.7%
111	2010	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	72.2%	59.0%
112	2012	100.0%	100.0%	89.5%	84.2%	66.4%
113	2014	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	77.8%	70.1%

Table A.3 – Correlation Matrix: Component Measures of CPG

	M^1	M^2	M^3	M^4	*CPG Score*
M^1	1.00				
M^2	0.93	1.00			
M^3	0.93	0.99	1.00		
M^4	0.72	0.85	0.87	1.00	
CPG Score	0.93	0.99	1.00	0.86	1.00

Figure A.1 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders vs. Committee Leaders, by Majority and Minority Party.



Figure A.2 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions (Including Leadership Committee Contributions) to Party Leaders vs. Committee Leaders, by Majority and Minority Party. Panels A and B show the trends of the mean percentages of PAC contributions, taking into account any additional leadership PAC contributions, across Congressional sessions. Panels C and D relate the CPG score to the mean percentages of PAC contributions, also taking into account any additional leadership PAC contributions.



Table A.4 – Results Based on Full Sample

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.283*	0.314*	0.308*	0.605*	0.651*	0.648*
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.011*	0.013*	-0.016*	0.009	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party Leader	0.263*	0.256*	0.270*	0.293*	0.278*	0.285*
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Committee Leader	0.010	0.017	0.028*	-0.002	0.009	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Quality Challenger		0.072*	0.071*		0.067*	0.066*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.034*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.354*	-0.350*		-0.336*	-0.332*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.008	-0.007		-0.010*	-0.010*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.017*	-0.018*		-0.017*	-0.017*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.024*	0.024*		0.025*	0.024*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.030*			0.030*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.002*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.250*	0.422*	0.425*	0.249*	0.410*	0.409*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.226	0.229	0.210	0.299	0.302
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file members.

Table A.5 – Results Based on Full Sample

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.288*	0.358*	0.350*	0.583*	0.688*	0.684*
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	0.268*	0.255*	0.249*	0.633*	0.622*	0.618*
	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.083)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.034	0.035	0.032	0.085*	0.082*	0.082*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.071*	0.067*	0.069*	0.101*	0.091*	0.091*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.021	0.010	0.005	0.033*	0.015	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
CPG Score	-0.020*	0.008	0.012	-0.032*	0.002	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Maj. Party Leader	0.276*	0.251*	0.267*	0.376*	0.334*	0.341*
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Min. Party Leader	0.245*	0.262*	0.276*	0.168*	0.183*	0.188*
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Committee Chair	0.033	0.046*	0.061*	0.020	0.035	0.042
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ranking Member	-0.010	-0.008	0.002	-0.023	-0.016	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Majority Status	0.015	0.017*	0.020*	0.009	0.019	0.021*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Quality Challenger		0.074*	0.072*		0.068*	0.068*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.034*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.346*	-0.342*		-0.326*	-0.323*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.003	-0.003		-0.006	-0.006
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.002	-0.003		0.003	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.015*	0.015*		0.016*	0.016*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.032*			0.034*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.002*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.240*	0.399*	0.401*	0.242*	0.383*	0.381*
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.111	0.232	0.236	0.223	0.311	0.315
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.012	0.010	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file members.

Table A.6 – Results Based on Full Sample, Member Fixed Effects

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.262*	0.345*	0.340*	0.255*	0.398*	0.389*
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.096)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	0.225*	0.208*	0.200*	0.446*	0.417*	0.400*
	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.114)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.060*	0.076*	0.071*	0.077*	0.094*	0.085*
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	-0.016	-0.008	-0.018	0.012	0.016	-0.001
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.092*	0.084*	0.079*	0.094*	0.083*	0.073*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
CPG Score	-0.049*	-0.036*	-0.067*	-0.035*	-0.022	-0.075*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Maj. Party Leader	0.178*	0.119	0.120	0.474*	0.381*	0.382*
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Min. Party Leader	0.125	0.145	0.147	0.104	0.136	0.143
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Committee Chair	0.040	0.028	0.030	0.047	0.035	0.039
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Ranking Member	0.078*	0.064*	0.070*	0.059*	0.049	0.058*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Majority Status	-0.053*	-0.048*	-0.045*	-0.051*	-0.043*	-0.036*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Quality Challenger		0.056*	0.056*		0.056*	0.055*
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Uncontested Election		-0.043*	-0.043*		-0.040*	-0.039*
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.222*	-0.225*		-0.214*	-0.229*
		(0.026)	(0.027)		(0.029)	(0.030)
Midterm		-0.002	-0.003		-0.003	-0.004
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Same Party as President		-0.001	-0.002		0.002	-0.000
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.009	0.010		0.008	0.010
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.006)	(0.005)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.009			0.010
			(0.009)			(0.010)
Seniority			0.002*			0.004*
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Constant	0.271*	0.356*	0.365*	0.255*	0.334*	0.356*
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Observations	7528	7181	7155	7144	6812	6788
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.023	0.002	0.002	0.078	0.002	0.002
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.021	0.032	0.030	0.000	0.001	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file members.

Table A.7 – Results Based on Sample Restricted to Party and Committee Leaders

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	1.195*	1.712*	1.847*	1.824*	2.488*	2.616*
	(0.605)	(0.600)	(0.608)	(0.692)	(0.690)	(0.699)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	1.066	0.992	1.051	2.412*	2.403*	2.450*
	(0.725)	(0.696)	(0.698)	(0.830)	(0.799)	(0.801)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	-0.221	-0.220	-0.123	-0.092	-0.143	-0.052
	(0.316)	(0.314)	(0.322)	(0.359)	(0.361)	(0.369)
CPG Score	0.117	0.252	0.190	-0.014	0.131	0.076
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.260)
Maj. Party Leader	2.394*	2.207*	2.133*	3.479*	3.279*	3.209*
	(0.447)	(0.431)	(0.435)	(0.525)	(0.514)	(0.518)
Min. Party Leader	2.039*	2.147*	2.095*	1.810*	1.848*	1.802*
	(0.537)	(0.516)	(0.517)	(0.633)	(0.609)	(0.610)
Committee Chair	0.464*	0.559*	0.485*	0.445	0.630*	0.561*
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.231)	(0.268)	(0.271)	(0.278)
Quality Challenger		0.552*	0.558*		0.495*	0.502*
		(0.145)	(0.145)		(0.153)	(0.153)
Uncontested Election		-0.243	-0.242		-0.213	-0.211
		(0.139)	(0.139)		(0.143)	(0.143)
Safeness of District		-2.349*	-2.306*		-1.912*	-1.863*
		(0.413)	(0.414)		(0.425)	(0.427)
Midterm		-0.049	-0.044		-0.106	-0.103
		(0.135)	(0.135)		(0.141)	(0.142)
Same Party as President		0.110	0.120		0.201	0.211
		(0.155)	(0.155)		(0.157)	(0.157)
Midterm x Same Party as President		-0.008	-0.007		0.075	0.077
		(0.198)	(0.198)		(0.208)	(0.208)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.085			0.142
			(0.481)			(0.488)
Seniority			0.017			0.015
			(0.012)			(0.012)
Constant	1.807*	2.874*	2.703*	1.727*	2.492*	2.324*
	(0.163)	(0.278)	(0.305)	(0.192)	(0.300)	(0.328)
Observations	804	775	775	762	734	734
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.361	0.361	0.466	0.509	0.509
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.020	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.142	0.155	0.133	0.004	0.003	0.002

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is ranking members.

Table A.8 – Results Based on Sample Restricted to Senior Members (At Least 4 Terms)

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.311*	0.422*	0.424*	0.644*	0.810*	0.812*
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	0.268	0.236	0.234	0.790*	0.762*	0.761*
	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.174)	(0.169)	(0.169)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	-0.013	0.005	0.006	0.052	0.065	0.066
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.043	0.026	0.026	0.070	0.041	0.041
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)
CPG Score x Majority Status	-0.020	-0.051	-0.050	-0.013	-0.054	-0.053
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)
CPG Score	-0.072*	-0.025	-0.025	-0.073*	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Maj. Party Leader	0.675*	0.622*	0.621*	0.935*	0.857*	0.856*
	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Min. Party Leader	0.644*	0.668*	0.664*	0.555*	0.577*	0.573*
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Committee Chair	0.149*	0.152*	0.150*	0.130*	0.134*	0.132*
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Ranking Member	0.073	0.073	0.072	0.065	0.075	0.074
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Majority Status	0.057*	0.074*	0.074*	0.063*	0.094*	0.094*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Quality Challenger		0.129*	0.128*		0.115*	0.115*
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Uncontested Election		-0.054*	-0.054*		-0.038*	-0.037*
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Safeness of District		-0.516*	-0.516*		-0.491*	-0.491*
		(0.041)	(0.041)		(0.043)	(0.043)
Midterm		0.011	0.012		0.003	0.003
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Same Party as President		0.020	0.020		0.033*	0.033*
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.002	0.002		0.004	0.004
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.020)	(0.020)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.070*			0.068*
			(0.031)			(0.032)
Seniority			0.001			0.001
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Constant	0.439*	0.662*	0.656*	0.421*	0.616*	0.610*
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Observations	4190	3996	3996	4010	3822	3822
Adjusted R^2	0.166	0.236	0.236	0.284	0.335	0.336
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.014	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.149	0.163	0.165	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file members.

Table A.9 – Results Based on Sample Without Speakers

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.193*	0.232*	0.227*	0.502*	0.557*	0.554*
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.060)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.011*	0.013*	-0.016*	0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party Leader	0.324*	0.307*	0.320*	0.348*	0.323*	0.328*
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Committee Leader	0.010	0.017	0.028*	-0.002	0.009	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Quality Challenger		0.072*	0.071*		0.067*	0.066*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.033*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.353*	-0.349*		-0.333*	-0.329*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.008	-0.008		-0.010*	-0.010*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.017*	-0.018*		-0.017*	-0.017*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.024*	0.024*		0.025*	0.024*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.030*			0.031*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.001*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.250*	0.421*	0.424*	0.249*	0.408*	0.407*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7512	7178	7152	7129	6810	6786
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.210	0.213	0.170	0.262	0.265
F p-value	0.012	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file members.

Figure A.3 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File – Non-Election Year Specification.



Figure A.4 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions, Sample Restricted to Party Leaders and Committee Leaders – Non-Election Year Specification.



Table A.10 – Non-Election Year Specification (Full Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.369*	0.391*	0.376*
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.055*	0.050*	0.048
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.012	0.017*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party Leader	0.326*	0.322*	0.354*
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Committee Leader	0.020	0.026	0.052*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Quality Challenger		0.035*	0.033*
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Uncontested Election		-0.001	-0.002
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Safeness of District		-0.282*	-0.276*
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Midterm		-0.009	-0.009
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Same Party as President		-0.033*	-0.034*
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.021*	0.020*
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.017
			(0.013)
Seniority			-0.003*
			(0.001)
Constant	0.247*	0.389*	0.398*
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	7140	6823	6799
Adjusted R^2	0.114	0.152	0.157
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

The reference category is rank-and-file members.

Table A.11 – Non-Election Year Specification (Full Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.335*	0.387*	0.365*
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)
CPG score x Min. Party Leader	0.412*	0.412*	0.403*
	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.101)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.043	0.036	0.026
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.067	0.065	0.069*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.015	0.013	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
CPG Score	-0.015	0.007	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Maj. Party Leader	0.396*	0.378*	0.413*
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Min. Party Leader	0.221*	0.231*	0.261*
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Committee Chair	0.052*	0.061*	0.094*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Ranking Member	-0.008	-0.007	0.013
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Majority Status	0.027*	0.018	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Quality Challenger		0.037*	0.034*
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Uncontested Election		-0.001	-0.002
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Safeness of District		-0.274*	-0.268*
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Midterm		-0.006	-0.006
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Same Party as President		-0.015*	-0.017*
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.013	0.013
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.019
			(0.013)
Seniority			-0.003*
			(0.001)
Constant	0.229*	0.364*	0.371*
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	7140	6823	6799
Adjusted R^2	0.127	0.160	0.164
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.001	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.001	0.001	0.002

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

The reference category is minority party rank-and-file members.